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A trinity composed of legally binding regulations, an independent financial mechanism, and a 
compliance mechanism characterizes the institutional design of the Minamata Convention on 
Mercury. Meanwhile, few existing environmental treaties feature an independent financial 
mechanism as well as a compliance mechanism. Why did the Minamata Convention acquire two 
mechanisms? There are two rival hypotheses on uncertainty about institutional consequences and 
international agreements. The rational design school posits that countries can predict institutional 
consequences by acquiring all pieces of relevant information (Koremenos et al. 2001) and views 
the trinity as a rational design to enhance developing countries’ regulatory capabilities under 
strict compliance. In contrast, the institutional diffusion school assumes that countries have 
limited information-processing abilities and use cognitive heuristics in designing institutions and 
argues that countries designed the trinity by learning from existing cases (Ovodenko and Keohane 
2012). In this paper, I compare the negotiations process of the Minamata Convention with that of 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). To test the hypotheses, I 
examine how countries resolved informational uncertainty in both negotiations by utilizing 
negotiations records and personal interviews with key officials as data. The analytical results 
support the institutional diffusion hypothesis by indicating that the trinity within the Minamata 
Convention is a product of countries’ heuristic and incremental learning from existing treaties.  
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1. Introduction 
Under what circumstances do countries agree on a set of institutions that can effectively solve 
environmental problems? The Minamata Convention on Mercury (hereafter the MC), a treaty 
aimed at regulating mercury, entails a unique institutional arrangement characterized by a 
“trinity” comprising (1) legally binding emissions regulations, (2) an independent financial 
mechanism for capacity building, and (3) a compliance mechanism with monitoring and 
evaluation.1 This trinity is expected to function coherently to enhance the treaty’s effectiveness. 
However, institutions featuring all three mechanisms have rarely been established historically.  
The MC is the first treaty within which the three institutions mentioned above were created 
upon the conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Among existing environmental treaties, the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (hereafter the MP) is another 
treaty including all three institutions, although two (the mechanisms of independent finance and 
compliance) were incorporated into the protocol several years after it took effect. A critical 
political dynamic should have been operating behind the simultaneous establishment of two 
institutions for the MC. Thus, this paper explores the political background that helped to create 
these institutions, ensuring compliance by focusing on the MC. 
The paper presumes that informational uncertainty regarding institutional consequences 
hinders the formation of agreements. There are two rival hypotheses on how countries deal with 
such uncertainty. The rational design school posits that countries can predict institutional 
consequences by acquiring all pieces of relevant information (Koremenos et al. 2001) and views 
the trinity as a rational design for enhancing developing countries’ regulatory capabilities under 
strict compliance. In contrast, the institutional diffusion school assumes that countries have 
limited information-processing abilities and use cognitive heuristics to design institutions; 
furthermore, this school argues that countries designed the trinity by learning from existing cases 
(Ovodenko and Keohane 2012). In this paper, I compare the MC with the 2001 Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (hereafter the SC), which failed to establish 
such a trinity. To test these hypotheses, I analyze the degree of distributional problems and how 
countries resolved informational uncertainty in each negotiation process. The analytical results 
support the institutional diffusion hypothesis by indicating that the MC trinity is a product of 
heuristic and incremental learning from existing treaties. For the MC, treaty experience was 
accumulated over a decade and effectively processed by negotiators to reduce uncertainty. 
Learning from experience, negotiators successfully evaluated institutional consequences more 
accurately. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the trinity’s functions in relation to 
compliance and evaluates existing studies on the MC’s institutional design. Section 3 proposes a 
theoretical and methodological approach for the analysis in Section 4. The final part summarizes 
the findings and offers implications for the literature.  
 
 
2. “Institutional Trinity” 
                                                      
1 In this paper, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are conceptualized as “environmental 
treaties.” Meanwhile, “institutions” indicate specific mechanisms (e.g., financial and compliance 
mechanisms) created within treaties. “Institutional design” indicates how treaties are structured. 
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Legally binding rules have an advantage in ensuring deep cooperation over non-binding rules. 
Nonetheless, a legally binding treaty might discourage countries from participating in it more 
strongly than a non-binding treaty. This is because countries with low capacities encounter higher 
compliance costs in participating in the former than in the latter. Thus, a major challenge in 
guaranteeing universal treaty participation is reducing compliance costs for low-capacity 
countries so that they can accept high-level commitments. Here, a financial provision is employed 
that lowers compliance costs to prevent non-compliance ascribed to insufficient capacity 
(Mitchell 2007: 915). However, in many environmental treaties, the causes of non-compliance are 
not well considered in financial allocation, and financial provision fails to correct non-
compliance. This is because a financial mechanism is not associated with an information system, 
such as a compliance mechanism, that monitors parties’ compliance status (Mitchell 2007: 915–
916). Therefore, financial aid is provided ineffectively without “knowing how the actors behaved 
with respect to the agreement’s proscriptions or prescriptions” (Mitchell 2007: 916). This is why 
financial aid is not appropriately allocated to correct non-compliant behaviors. Such a 
shortcoming in a financial provision generates mutual suspicion between developed and 
developing countries: the former suspect that financial provisions are ineffective and then request 
they be more cost-efficient. In light of the increasing emphasis on cost efficiency, developing 
countries have recently criticized the Global Environmental Facility’s (GEF) financial allocation 
procedure, which align with developed countries’ political interests rather than with the capacity-
building needs of developing countries (Marcoux et al. 2011: 35; Streck 2001).   
     An effective way to overcome the problem is to combine an independent financial mechanism 
with a compliance mechanism. The MP provides a good example for this integrative approach. A 
compliance mechanism, distinguished from a reporting or implementation system, is the most 
advanced mechanism to ensure compliance; when administered by a committee under the aegis of 
the Conference of the Parties (COP; a treaty’s governing body), such a mechanism can identify 
non-compliance, determine its underlying causes, and ensure compliance through appropriate 
capacity-building measures (Raustiala 2001: 9–14). Equally important, a compliance mechanism 
performs effectively with a proper financial mechanism (De Chazournes 2006). For example, an 
independent fund like the Multilateral Fund (MLF), internalized within the MP (rather than the 
GEF as an external organization), was easily incorporated into a compliance mechanism insofar 
as both mechanisms operate under the COP. Under the protocol, monitoring by a compliance 
committee has helped to allocate multilateral funds appropriately to address non-compliance 
causes (Victor 1999). This ensures that most countries view alternative actions as more attractive 
than their existing non-compliant behaviors, which are not achieved with financial provisions 
under many environmental treaties (Mitchell 2007: 916). Therefore, the integrative mechanisms 
combining compliance and independent finance can enhance compliance with legally binding 
commitments (Brunnée 2006; De Chazournes 2006; Victor 1999). This has recently been 
recognized among the scholars and practitioners who observed major progress in the 
effectiveness of the MP. The Principal Coordinator of the Interim Secretariat of the Minamata 
Convention on Mercury also views the MC as “ambitious” as it entails a set of institutions to 
ensure high levels of compliance.2  
                                                      
2 The author’s interview with the Principal Coordinator of the Interim Secretariat of the Minamata 
Convention on Mercury took place on June 29, 2017. 
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Similarly, based on interviews with stakeholders, Templeton and Kohler (2014) argued that the 
treaty established a compliance mechanism because  (1) inter-linkage with a financial mechanism 
and (2) intellectual or entrepreneurial leadership by the chairs enabled the parties to agree to 
establish a compliance mechanism. Templeton and Kohler’s analysis (2014), which encompasses 
both financial and compliance mechanisms, is close to my attempt at explaining a trinity. 
However, they did not conduct a comparative analysis and could not account for why the MC 
created both an independent fund and a compliance mechanism but similar chemicals treaties did 
not. In fact, the mercury negotiations are not the first case in which both financial and compliance 
mechanisms were discussed as important agendas.3 Below, I provide a detailed examination of 
the issue linkage between financial and compliance mechanisms that led to the foundation of a 
trinity in the MC.4 
 
3. Theory and Methodology 
3.1 Theory  
In designing a treaty to solve environmental problems, countries should reduce uncertainty 
regarding the consequences of the institutions that they establish within the treaty. The rational 
design school views a treaty as a rational construct for solving environmental problems in 
accordance with issue-specific factors such as issue visibility, the interest structure, and 
regulatory costs (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Koremenos et al. 2001; Mitchell 1994; Mitchell and 
Keilbach 2001). This school assumes that treaty negotiators can resolve informational uncertainty 
about institutional consequences. It posits that countries facing uncertainty can predict outcomes 
of institutional choices correctly and solve issue-specific problems by determining a variety of 
institutional mechanisms, including the size of membership, the scope of issues, the degree of 
centralization, and the strength of regulatory control.  
In contrast, the institutional diffusion school takes informational uncertainty more seriously. It 
assumes that informational scarcity is prevalent, which largely influences institutional design 
through negotiations (Ovodenko and Keohane 2012: 523). Thompson (2010: 274–275) argues 
that uncertainty is high if multiple institutional solutions to a problem exist, thus prompting 
countries to have conflicting views on which solution is best. Furthermore, such uncertainty 
would be generally high in the initial stages of treaty-making because negotiators rarely share ex 
ante sufficient technical, legal, and scientific knowledge to predict and evaluate the outcomes of 
institutional choices. This school considers that institutions are transferred from one treaty to 
another via cognitive heuristics and incremental learning. This idea originated with organizational 
theorists in the 1950s. Alchian (1950) maintains that organizations typically lack relevant 
information and skills to perform maximizing calculations; Simon (1957: 198) asserts that this is 
because “the size of the problems… requir[ing] objectively rational behavior” is broader than the 
mind’s complex problem-solving capacity. Faced with uncertainty, organizations generalize from 
a handful of proximate examples and imitate them inappropriately (Weyland 2005: 284–286; 
Marsh and Sharman 2009: 282). They rely on cognitive heuristics and incremental learning, 
which are distinct from rational learning. Nonetheless, information accumulates incrementally 
through the discovery of new information (Boerner et al. 2001: 92), which organizations 
                                                      
3 See Note 2. 
4 For detailed institutional analyses of the MC, see Andresen et al. (2013), Selin (2014), Eriksen and Perrez 
(2014), Stokes et al. (2016), and Sun (2017).  
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incorporate into their prior knowledge through slow updating. They may also take wrong cues 
from the policy experiences of others or a wrong-headed theory (Simmons et al. 2006: 795–797).  
 In the context of environmental treaties, Ovodenko and Keohane (2012: 523) maintain that 
“[f]or governments seeking information about the likely consequences of specific institutional 
designs, existing institutions are natural sources of information.” They provide a model of 
“mimetic diffusion” within which parties adopt successful treaty institutions for similar 
environmental problems, which in turn can provide focal points for resolving informational 
uncertainty (Ovodenko and Keohane 2012: 534). Additionally, they argue that international 
organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), assist countries in 
mimetic diffusion and the institutionalization of treaties by acquiring knowledge on specific types 
of environmental problems and particular cases of institutional development. While they 
recognize the role of international organization and the intervening effect of state interests and 
power on diffusion, they do not fully incorporate negotiations into their analysis (Ovodenko and 
Keohane 2012: 538–539).  
 Informational uncertainty, however, is not the only factor that accounts for a trinity. One 
might attribute the presence or absence of the trinity to the feasibility of an agreement. Mitchell 
and Keilbach (2001: 894–896) and Mitchell (2010: 113–122) contend that a determinant of 
agreement is the severity of a distributional problem in terms of how to allocate regulatory costs 
and benefits among the parties involved. However, if distributional outcomes arising from the 
treaty between them are excessively divergent, or if a distributional problem is severe, countries 
face substantial difficulty in agreeing on a treaty (Ovodenko and Keohane 2012: 534–535).  
By contrast, if a distributional problem is moderate, informational uncertainty matters in reaching 
a trinity. 
 These rival arguments suggest the following hypotheses5:  
H1: If a distributional problem is moderate, negotiators can agree on a trinity because negotiators 
are a priori rational and capable of processing all relevant information for institution building. 
H2: If a distributional problem is moderate, negotiators can only agree on a trinity when they 
have acquired abundant informational sources to learn about institutional consequences through 




To evaluate these hypotheses, I analyze the Minamata and Stockholm Conventions for the 
following reasons. First, both the SC (2004) and the MC (2013) entered into force after 2000. 
Second, both treaties have similar goals of protecting human health and the environment from 
toxic chemicals that remain intact in the environment for long periods. Due to regulatory 
similarity, countries initially attempted to incorporate a “mercury protocol” of regulations into the 
SC (UNEP 2007: 61–65). However, they decided against this because a treaty covering both 
POPs and mercury would provide laxer regulation of mercury than a treaty solely focusing on 
regulating mercury (Selin and Selin 2006: 266).  
Despite these similarities, neither an independent fund nor a compliance mechanism was 
established in the SC as was in the MC (see Section 4-1). The SC created the GEF as an interim 
                                                      
5 In this article, I evaluate the empirical validity of these hypotheses by assuming that negotiators are 
rational with high information processing abilities. 
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financial mechanism and an enabling clause stipulating that the parties put into place a 
compliance mechanism in future COP meetings. Such a mechanism, however, was never agreed 
upon in following COPs. I analyze below the extent of the distributional problems and 
informational uncertainty in both conventions to determine what factors differentiated their 
respective institutional designs. More specifically, I explore how countries dealt with uncertainty 
and agreed on an independent fund and a compliance mechanism in the Minamata negotiations. 
The subsequent analysis weighs more on the mercury negotiations rather than the POPs 
negotiations, owing to my main focus on the MC. 
To evaluate my hypotheses, I adopt the following steps in examining two plausible explanatory 
variables that could differentiate institutional designs between the two conventions. First, I 
compare the two conventions regarding the degree of distributional problems. I measure the 
intensity of the distributional problems using issue-specific factors including issue visibility, the 
obligations of developed and developing countries, and the technological and economic costs of 
regulations (Mitchell 2010: 113–122). Issue visibility, based on scientific evidence, fosters 
awareness of the seriousness of environmental problems, which in turn facilitates cooperation. 
The distribution of regulatory obligations matters, because if developed countries have already 
made substantial policy efforts and technological progress vis-à-vis developing countries, it 
would be easier for all countries involved to reach an agreement. Finally, lowering technological 
and economic costs incurred from switching to alternative substances would make countries less 
resistant to regulation. 
Second, I assess how countries dealt with uncertainty over the consequences of institutional 
choices. Owing to difficulty in objectively analyzing the extent to which negotiating countries 
knew about institutional consequences, I analyze both countries’ knowledge based on the 
availability of information on these ramifications and their utilization of such information to 
support their positions. More specifically, I identify the kinds of documents on existing treaties 
prepared by UNEP and then analyze how the contents of those documents influenced proposals 
and suggestions made by countries to the negotiations. If I find either of the two variables 
representing the severity of distributional problems and the extent of informational uncertainty, to 
differ between the two, I then assess how that variable can account for the observed institutional 
difference between the two treaties.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Outcomes of the Negotiations  
 The mercury and POPs negotiations faced similar conflicts over the financial and compliance 
mechanisms. Regarding a financial mechanism, developing countries supported a new 
independent fund, while developing countries supported existing funds such as the GEF (UNEP 
1999; UNEP 2010c: 10).6  In terms of a compliance mechanism, developed countries backed it 
                                                      
6 Since the 1990s, developing countries have sharpened their criticism of the GEF for its bias toward donor 
nations and cumbersome application procedures (the author’s interview with the UNEP International 
Environmental Technology Centre [IETC] official, who was a former delegate to the negotiations for the 
Minamata Convention on October 7, 2016).  
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while developing countries opposed it.7 Despite the same contentions over both mechanisms, the 
resulting institutional outcomes were different.  
 
4.1.1 The Minamata Convention 
At the 25th session of the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum 
(GC-25/GMEF) in February 2009, countries agreed to establish a legally binding instrument on 
mercury. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) met five times from 2010 to 2013 
and negotiated a draft treaty text. At INC5 (in 2013), countries agreed on a compliance and a 
financial mechanism. Both developing and developed countries engaged in reciprocal 
concessions. At an early stage of INC5, both sides agreed to form the “Implementation and 
Compliance Committee” (ICC) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin [ENB] 2013: 16–17). Despite their 
initial opposition to a compliance mechanism, developing countries accepted it because they 
inferred from progress in informal meetings that their developed counterparts were ready to 
concede on the financial mechanism later at INC5.8 Satisfied with a well-structured compliance 
mechanism, developed countries in turn agreed to create an independent fund. They found it a 
good strategy to consent to a financial mechanism that would make the compliance mechanism 
more functional.9 Then, both sides agreed on a GEF-plus package including three financial funds: 
(1) the Specific International Program (SIP); (2) the GEF; and (3) the Special Program (ENB 
2013: 15–16). The SIP, a variant of an independent fund, was modeled after the ozone national 
units, a core component of the MLF under the MP (ENB 2013: 24).10 The foundation of the SIP 
as an independent fund, is regarded as a remarkable step in the history of environmental treaties.  
 
 
 4.1.2 The Stockholm Convention 
The SC was negotiated in five steps from 1998 to 2000. Neither an independent fund nor a 
compliance mechanism was established by the convention. Instead, negotiators compromised on 
a tentative agreement for both. During the last negotiation stage of INC5, delegates considered a 
compliance mechanism and agreed on a compromise draft text containing an enabling clause 
suggested by the chair. The clause included a supplementary provision stating that “the COP 
shall, as soon as practicable, develop and approve procedures and institutional mechanisms for 
determining non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention and for the treatment of 
Parties found to be in non-compliance” (ENB 2000b: 12). As for a financial mechanism, 
countries finally agreed on a quasi-enabling clause that established the GEF as an “interim” 
financial mechanism until an independent fund was created at a future meeting (ENB 2000b: 11–
12). During the POPs negotiations, reciprocal concessions were never made because initial 
disagreements over both mechanisms remained unresolved throughout the process. This raises a 
question: Why were reciprocal concessions made in the mercury negotiations but not in the POPs 
                                                      
7 See Note 2. 
8 The author’s interview with a former Deputy Director of UNEP’s Law Division, Mr. Nagai (Nairobi, July 
17, 2017). 
9 See Note 2. 
10 The Special Program, a temporary financial mechanism of capacity building for least-developing 
countries, was meant to offset the GEF’s deficiency.  
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negotiations?  In the following section, I will identify a factor observed only in the mercury 
negotiations that led to reciprocal concessions. 
 
 
4.2 Distributional Problems 
 As argued in the theory section, we can explain distinct institutional outcomes by the different 
levels of distributional problems. In this section, I will explore whether the levels of distributional 
problems differed between the two conventions. The intensity of the distributional problems is 
measured by such issue-specific factors as issue visibility, the obligations of developed and 
developing countries, and the technological and economic costs of regulation. My analysis 
indicates that the intensity of a distributional problem is equally moderate.   
 
4.2.1 Issue visibility 
Regarding the MC, prior to the onset of the mercury negotiations, countries received the 
UNEP global mercury assessment (UNEP Chemicals and Inter-Organization Programme for the 
Sound Management of Chemicals [IOPSMC] 2002: Paragraph 139), which contains solid 
scientific evidence on the dangers of mercury. The report includes data on mercury exposure 
levels across regions (UNEP Chemicals and IOPSMC 2002: Paragraph 336). Having recognized 
this danger, countries shared a need for international action to reduce or eliminate mercury use.11 
Likewise, regarding the SC, solid scientific evidence exists based on the toxicity of the “dirty 
dozen” POPs initially regulated by the treaty, including intentionally produced pesticides, 
dioxins, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and furans. Negotiators agreed to regulate most of 
these substances with relative ease, based on solid evidence (Yoder 2003: 141). Indeed, the final 
agreement on POPs was strongly supported by a variety of stakeholders, including government 
and public health officials, policymakers, and representatives from both environmental groups 




For the MC, the UNEP mercury assessment report indicated that while the use of mercury in 
developed countries has declined over recent decades, the use of mercury and mercury 
technologies is increasing across many developing countries (UNEP Chemicals and IOPSMC 
2002: Paragraph 14). Developed countries have engaged in national and regional efforts to phase 
out the use of mercury in manufactured goods (e.g., thermometers) and in industrial processes 
(e.g., the chlor-alkali industry) by developing alternative technological methods (UNEP 
Chemicals and IOPSMC 2002: Paragraphs 728–793). Thus, the mercury problem was regarded as 
a matter of developing countries lacking safe alternative substances and disposal techniques. Due 
to technological progress, alternative substances and techniques have become available and will 
be transferred to developing countries by establishing a financial mechanism for licensing and 
training (UNEP Chemicals and IOPSMC 2002: Paragraph 14). 
The interest structure of POPs was also similar to that of mercury. Many developed countries, 
including the European Union (EU) and the US, have already taken considerable policy measures 
                                                      
11 The author’s interview with UNEP officials during the COP1 meetings of the Minamata Convention 
(Geneva, September 2017). See Note 2. 
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to regulate or phase out POPs. The US had implemented domestic measures regulating POPs and 
was fully prepared to regulate the “dirty dozen” before the POPs negotiation started (Schafer 
2002: 171). Developed countries found it important to include in the treaty the developing 
countries that utilize POPs extensively as pesticides and for other industrial and agricultural 
purposes (Ahlgren 2014: 5). 
 
 
4.2.3 Technological and economic costs 
For the MC, the industries that needed to be regulated were limited to sectors such as coal-
fired power plants, chlor-alkali plants, and the mining and manufacturing of gold (UNEP 
Chemicals and IOPSMC 2002: Paragraph 27). The regulatory costs associated with reducing 
mercury usage in these industries were sufficiently low. Commercial applications of POPs were 
limited to specific industries and agriculture, and alternative substances were available at 
reasonable costs (Yoder 2003). With respect to the regulatory costs of chemical substances 
targeted under the convention, Yoder (2003: 151) asserts that the SC is similar to the MP. 
In sum, the above analysis shows that the intensity of distributional problems, measured by 
issue structure, was equally moderate between the two negotiations. The same level of 
distributional problems should have resulted in the same institutional outcomes for the two 
treaties if all else were held equal. Thus, the absence of an independent fund and a compliance 
mechanism in the SC suggests that other factors can explain the different institutional outcomes. 
In the next subsection, I examine the influence of informational uncertainty by holding the 
intensity of a distributional problem constant.  
 
4.3 Informational Uncertainty and Learning 
 As hypothesized, how countries deal with uncertainty over consequences of institutional 
choices influences institutional outcomes. Thus, I analyze the availability of negotiations 
documents and other learning sources through which negotiating countries can learn about 
institutional consequences from existing treaties. I also explore how negotiating countries utilized 
such information to advance their positions, which actually changed negotiation processes and 
outcomes.  
In the mercury negotiations, countries obtained information-rich documents because UNEP 
responded favorably to the negotiating countries’ request for information on the institutional 
performance of existing treaties. At the ad hoc Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) held in 
2009 prior to the INC, several countries requested that the secretariat provide information on a 
variety of financial and compliance mechanisms.12 For example, some said it would be useful to 
have information on financial and technical assistance models (UNEP 2009: 10). One 
representative requested documents on compliance mechanisms and their relative effectiveness 
(UNEP 2009: 10). Expressing their strong support for the MC, the EU and Switzerland requested 
such information to improve the Convention’s effectiveness and avoid repeating the fates of other 
chemicals treaties.13 In general, before intergovernmental negotiations begin, negotiating 
countries determine their own issue positions by carefully and thoroughly examining 
                                                      
12 See Note 8. 
13 See Note 8. 
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supplementary documents submitted by UNEP.14 Thus, throughout the mercury negotiations, 
UNEP documents had significant influence on the countries’ positions and serves as viable 
sources of information, given that countries rarely made their own independent analyses of 
institutional options regarding financial assistance and compliance.15 
Representatives of the mercury negotiations who also participated in the annual COP meetings 
of other chemicals treaties requested the documents. Co-representation was a result of 
coordination between the chemicals treaties. Aiming at improving the efficiency of implementing 
the three chemicals-related treaties, the secretariats of the Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm 
Conventions (the “BRS secretariats”) coordinated administrative activities such as national 
reporting and integrated individual COP meetings into “Triple COPs” in 2010.16 Due to this 
integration, the MC has been embedded in the family of chemicals treaties.17 Participating in all 
chemicals COPs, representatives became aware that even after the treaties took effect, the 
financial mechanisms remained weak and the enabling clause never turned into a compliance 
mechanism. Frustrated with these problems, they urged UNEP to improve the role of information 
and provide a detailed analysis of both mechanisms in the treaties. 18 As a consequence, 
representatives in the mercury negotiations learned from the negotiations of existing treaties 
through UNEP documents, participation in the chemicals COPs, or both. 
 In the SC, however, countries did not request that UNEP provide documents before the INC 
began.19 Developed and developing countries were both optimistic that the environmental treaties 
agreed thus far would perform fairly well and did not find it necessary to acquire new data to 
improve the treaties. Hence, few new UNEP documents were submitted to the POPs negotiations. 
Regarding the financial mechanism, the documents provided by UNEP were limited in terms of 
volume and quality. UNEP merely provided one document listing the types of financial 
mechanisms adopted by existing environmental treaties but lacking comparative analyses (UNEP 
1998a, 1998b). As for a compliance mechanism, UNEP did not prepare a single document. In 
1998 when the POPs negotiations began, the available information on both financial and 
compliance mechanisms was limited to that on the MP and the Basel Convention on the Control 
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (hereafter the Basel 
Convention). As shown below, such an informational shortage generated optimism among the 
negotiators on the interim GEF and an enabling clause. 
 
4.4 Influence on negotiation dynamics 
Owing to the UNEP documents on institutional consequences, the mercury negotiators learned 
about (1) functional linkage between financial and compliance mechanisms, (2) the dearth of 
financial mechanisms in chemicals treaties, and (3) the lack of an enabling clause for a 
compliance mechanism. In the following, I explore how each informational element changed the 
                                                      
14 See Note 6. 
15 See Note 8. 
16 http://www.brsmeas.org, last accessed on July 20, 2017. 
17 Representatives for chemicals treaties, including the MC, are different from those for other issues, such 
as climate change. See Notes 11 and 8.  
18 See Note 8. 
19 The MC exceptionally set the stage for the pre-meeting, which gave countries opportunities to request 
information proactively. See Note 8. 
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negotiation dynamics, leading to reciprocal concessions during the subsequent phases of the 
mercury negotiations but not during the POPs negotiations. 
 
4.4.1 Information on functional linkage  
First, the documents related to the financial mechanism provided a comparative analysis of the 
pros and cons of various financial mechanisms that had operated under existing treaties (UNEP 
2010b; UNEP 2011b). Based on the experiences in other treaties, the documents guided which 
form of financial mechanism could operate more effectively with a compliance mechanism. The 
documents indicated that an independent fund (e.g., the MLF, originally developed to enhance 
parties’ compliance) could ensure functional linkage with a compliance mechanism more easily 
than the GEF to promote parties’ implementation activities (UNEP 2010b: 10; UNEP 2011b: 12–
13; UNEP 2010a: 12–13). For example, while the GEF for the SC was aimed at promoting 
implementation activities that are not directly related to compliance, the MLF for the MP 
specified its funding scope to compliance-related projects and successfully improved compliance 
(UNEP 2011b: 12–13). Furthermore, voluntary trust funds such as those established for the Basel 
and Rotterdam Conventions are smaller and more difficult to handle for compliance purposes 
(UNEP 2010a: 13). In addition, the document recommended that representatives in the INC 
consider the possibility of negotiating and agreeing upon compliance and financial provisions of 
the mercury instrument as a package, rather than deal with them separately (UNEP 2010a: 13). 
This information led countries to realize the importance of functional linkage between 
compliance and financial mechanisms during the negotiations, as evident in their statements.  
With the above information, countries became increasingly aware that both mechanisms 
together would serve their interests. Already in INC1, many countries requested linking 
discussions between the two (UNEP 2010c: 10–11; ENB 2010: 5, 12). For example, several 
countries emphasized the importance of functionally ensuring the linkage between compliance 
and financial mechanisms from the beginning (UNEP 2010c: 11). Unexpectedly, the African 
Group stressed functional linkage between compliance and financial mechanisms, stating that it 
would accept a compliance mechanism insofar as the mechanism was coordinated closely with 
funding and technology transfer (ENB 2010: 5). Recognizing a strong functional link between 
financial assistance and compliance, several representatives suggested that the establishment of a 
financial mechanism be accompanied by a compliance mechanism (UNEP 2011a: 25). 
Learning about functional linkage between the two mechanisms from the UNEP documents, 
countries viewed the mechanisms not as separate but rather as integral institutions. Both 
developed and developing countries noticed that functional linkage would produce a positive 
synergy, which would result in reciprocal concessions in subsequent negotiations. On the other 
hand, in the POPs negotiations no information was presented on the functional linkage; therefore, 
two mechanisms were negotiated as completely separate agendas as indicated below. 
 
4.4.2 Information on the financial mechanism 
Second, representatives learned from a financial discussion developed in chemicals COPs. An 
integrated financial approach across chemicals treaties was initiated in the negotiations of COP4 
for the SC, based on recognition of the need for adequate resources in the field of chemicals and 
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waste management.20 Then-executive director Achim Steiner led an initiative to enhance the 
effectiveness of chemicals treaties by reducing the problem of underfunding.21 Countries 
acknowledged financial scarcity as a significant problem underlying the family of chemicals 
treaties that had either a voluntary fund or the interim GEF as their financial mechanism. During 
the mercury negotiation, developing countries cited the insufficiency of financial provisions as a 
reason for an independent fund to be created in the MC. 
Learning from chemicals COPs, however, countries recognized the limitations of the GEF and 
acknowledged the virtue of an independent fund—a more appealing option for developed and 
developing countries alike. At the beginning of negotiations, developed countries supported the 
GEF, while developing nations backed an independent fund. Developing countries strongly 
requested an independent fund, stressing that the financial provisions in the chemical treaties 
were insufficient. The African Group requested the foundation of an adequately financed 
independent fund on mercury to be governed by the COP for transparency, accessibility, equality, 
and responsiveness to their needs (ENB 2010: 5). As stated above, the African Group said it 
would accept a compliance mechanism once its request for independent funds was met. The EU, 
Norway, and Switzerland, albeit initially having favored the GEF, admitted that it was not an 
effective capacity-building measure (ENB 2010: 11). In addition, several developed countries 
implied their intention to approve an independent fund. While viewing the GEF as their preferred 
option, the EU countries, Switzerland, and Canada stated that they were open to the idea of a 
multilateral fund (i.e., an independent fund) (ENB 2011a: 9). One representative argued that the 
MLF was key to the success of the MP, as it provided developing countries with funds for 
implementation and compliance (UNEP 2011c: 20). They changed their positions based on 
recognition of the GEF’s limitations and the relative effectiveness of an independent fund in 
capacity building. Thus, developed countries became willing to consider creating an independent 
fund along with the GEF (UNEP 2012: 18). Such a conciliatory attitude led developing countries 
to strengthen their position on an independent fund and concede on a compliance mechanism 
(UNEP 2010c: 10).  
In the POPs negotiations, there was one document on financial options prepared for INC2. 
However, it only listed types of financial mechanisms adopted by existing environmental treaties 
and did not provide a detailed analysis on the financial mechanisms. The conflict between an 
independent fund and the GEF surfaced in INC2, and never eased throughout the remaining 
negotiations. Several representatives suggested a third proposal of combining an independent 
fund and the GEF in INC4 (UNEP 2000: 16), but this proposal was not included into the draft 
text, unlike the mercury negotiations (ENB 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b). Based on limited 
experiences with the voluntary fund of the Basel Convention, countries probably believed that an 
interim GEF as a compromise would be more robust than a voluntary fund. However, the former 
later turned out to be as fragile as the latter. 
 
4.4.3 Information on the compliance mechanism 
                                                      
20 This point was extracted from the Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm Conventions website 
http://www.brsmeas.org/Implementation/ResourceMobilization/ConsultativeProcessonFinancingOptions/ta
bid/2880/language/es-CO/Default.aspx (last accessed on July 20, 2017). 
21 See Note 2. 
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Regarding the compliance mechanism, countries learned about the institutional consequences 
directly from chemicals COPs as well as from UNEP documents. As mentioned above, 
representatives failed to reach an agreement to make the enabling clause into a compliance 
mechanism for the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions.22 In addition, one UNEP document on 
a compliance mechanism stressed the difficulties facing chemicals treaties (UNEP 2010a). It 
showed that an enabling clause was used to obtain agreement for the conclusion of a treaty when 
parties could not settle their divisive opinions on a compliance mechanism within a negotiations 
timetable. The enabling clause has not become a compliance mechanism in COPs to date because 
of the political difficulties associated with renegotiations. Neither the Rotterdam nor the 
Stockholm Convention has established compliance procedures, although both include enabling 
clauses (UNEP 2010a: 14).  
Recognizing the shortcoming of an enabling clause, both parties increased support for a 
compliance mechanism. At the beginning of the negotiations, developed countries preferred a 
compliance mechanism equipped with a compliance committee within the treaty text, while 
developing countries preferred an enabling clause that would become a compliance mechanism at 
an appropriate time after the treaty entered into force (UNEP 2010c: 10). The EU, Switzerland, 
Norway, and Canada highlighted the importance of a compliance mechanism with a compliance 
committee to be established upon the conclusion of a treaty. They suggested that both the 
Rotterdam and the Stockholm Conventions failed to create compliance procedures despite the 
adoption of enabling clauses (ENB 2010: 12). However, to obtain a compliance mechanism, the 
EU, the US, Japan, Canada, Norway, and the African Group proposed to establish a committee in 
the treaty text that would encompass “implementation” and/or “compliance” (ENB 2011a: 9). 
This was because developed countries predicted that an “implementation” committee would be 
more acceptable for developing countries than a compliance committee with a nuance of political 
intervention (ENB 2011a: 13). In reaction to the proposal, developing countries other than the 
African Group renounced an enabling clause option, allowing convergence into a “within-the-
treaty-text” option for a compliance mechanism. This was also aimed at inducing concessions by 
developed countries over an independent fund (ENB 2011b: 13). Such moves led to a successful 
agreement on creating a compliance mechanism in the last INC5. 
In sum, upon learning about the shortcoming of an enabling clause, developing countries chose 
to accept a compliance mechanism to obtain an independent fund. Likewise, after learning about 
the difficulty of establishing compliance mechanisms within the chemical treaties, developed 
countries strengthened their claim on compliance in the mercury treaty text to avoid repeating the 
failures of the chemical treaties. Both sides reciprocated concessions, contributing to the 
formation of a trinity.   
In the POPs negotiations, no informational document on a compliance mechanism was 
prepared by the UNEP. Already in INC2, many representatives claimed that a compliance 
mechanism should be created to determine non-compliance and to assist non-compliant parties in 
securing compliance (UNEP 1999). However, developing countries opposed a compliance 
mechanism. Nonetheless, developed countries did not strongly demand the establishment of a 
compliance mechanism for the rest of the POPs negotiations, while they did so in the mercury 
negotiations (ENB 1999a, 1999b). Thus, a compliance clause was not seriously discussed before 
                                                      
22 See Note 11. 
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an enabling clause was adopted as a compromise due to a shortage of time (ENB 2000a). The MP 
had an effective mechanism formed several years after its adoption, despite its lack of an enabling 
clause in its original treaty text.23 In this regard, an enabling clause within the SC was regarded as 
a major step achieved upon conclusion. Moreover, this was right before the Basel Convention 
converted an enabling clause into an actual compliance mechanism in 2002. Having observed 
these developments, countries believed that an enabling clause could be easily turned into a 
compliance mechanism. Furthermore, the Rotterdam Convention had just adopted an enabling 
clause in 1998. These suggest that the institutional consequences of an enabling clause were still 
unknown at the time and over-evaluated due to limited learning sources. Thus, negotiating 
countries of the POPs found it convenient to postpone a substantive discussion by adopting an 
enabling clause as a temporary measure.  
 
The analyses of the mercury and POPs negotiations can be summarized as follows. Having 
learned from UNEP documents as well as chemicals COPs meetings, negotiating countries of the 
MC benefited from abundant sources of information, while those of the SC did not. The 
negotiators for the MC observed the variable consequences of both compliance and financial 
mechanisms in the chemical treaties, including the SC, providing an impetus to create a trinity. 
The above explanation can be contrasted with alternative interpretations deriving from rival 
theories of international relations. First, the hegemonic stability theory posits that the successful 
adoption of a trinity in Minamata is attributable to hegemonic leadership therein, whereas the 
failure of Stockholm owes to hegemonic absence. Contrary to the realist prediction, the EU 
played a leadership role in establishing effective treaties in both negotiations, bearing fruits in the 
former but not in the latter.24 Second, constructivist theory predicts that epistemic communities 
should obtain a consensus on the scientific assessment of mercury’s toxicity for strong 
institutions (i.e., an independent fund and a compliance mechanism), whereas they should have 
ambivalent assessment of the toxicity of POPs regulated by Stockholm for weak ones. Again, 
constructivism is rejected in light of the fact that epistemic communities held consensual 
evaluations on the toxicity of both mercury and the POPs, as demonstrated in Section 4.2.1.     
 
 
5. Conclusion: Incremental learning and mimetic diffusion 
 In this paper, I have asked why countries agreed to establish both an independent fund and a 
compliance mechanism in the MC but not in the SC. To answer this question, I examined two 
factors: (1) the severity of distributional problems and (2) how countries dealt with informational 
uncertainty about institutional consequences. I found that distributional problems were moderate 
for both the Mercury and Stockholm Conventions. On the other hand, countries dealt with 
uncertainty better in the Minamata negotiations than in the Stockholm negotiations because 
information on institutional consequences was abundant in the former but limited in the latter. 
  The comparative analysis supports H2 over H1, leading me to conclude that institutional 
diffusion theory can account for a trinity in the MC. Throughout the Stockholm negotiations, 
countries failed to establish an independent fund and a compliance mechanism, even though the 
distributional problem was as moderate as that of the MC. The absence of two mechanisms in the 
                                                      
23 See Note 8. 
24 See Note 11. 
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SC can be traced to the scarcity of information that resulted in limited and even incorrect 
understandings of institutional consequences. In relation to Templeton and Kohler (2014), this 
paper reveals that issue linkage – critical to the Minamata agreement – was ensured because 
negotiating counties learned from existing treaties. Furthermore, the paper provides evidence for 
mimetic diffusion and incremental learning (Boerner et al. 2001: 92, 104, Ovodenko and Keohane 
2012). As for the POPs negotiations, treaty experience was limited, and information was not 
processed appropriately to predict institutional consequences. Faced with high uncertainty, 
countries appeared to engage in mimetic diffusion by adopting existing institutions believed to be 
successful. However, for the MC, treaty experience was accumulated over a decade and 
effectively processed by negotiators to reduce uncertainty. 
 However, even if incremental learning evolves along with informational intermediation, 
negotiating countries may not be able to reach an agreement on a suitable institutional design 
when an underlying distributional problem is too severe like climate change. In this respect, my 
findings are not generalizable because they rest on a set of treaties with moderate distributional 
problems. Nonetheless, both the POPs and mercury negotiations were characterized by 
conflicting interests, which were overcome by reducing informational uncertainty. My findings 
shed light on the importance of analyzing informational uncertainty as a determinant of 
institutional outcomes. Future research should explore the influence of informational uncertainty 
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